Introduction
In the last decade, implanted technologies have received quite a lot of scholarly attention.
Especially if they touch upon neurological functions, they have been seen as having profound implications for what it means to be human (McGee 2008; Verbeek 2008; . Generally inscribed within broader discussions about the consequences and desirability of human enhancement, reflections on these technologies have taken the shape of rather speculative ethical judgments on 'hyped' technological devices, for example, brain-computer interfaces, deep brain stimulation, or thought-controlled prosthetic limbs (e.g. Sandberg and Bostrom 2006; Vedder and Klaming 2010) . However, not only has Alfred Nordmann (2007) emphasised the deceit at play in speculative ethics, especially in its 'if … then' argumentative structure, but this type of ethics also tends to ignore or erase the material grounds and realities in which (these implanted) technologies are embedded.
Remarkably, while the fields of science and technology studies (STS) and philosophy of technology have attended to the ways in which tools and technologies shape and (re-) configure our actions, intentions and subjectivities -our lives -they have scarcely accounted for implanted technologies and their ever more intimate relations with humans. Assuredly, the concepts of, for example, technical mediation and script shed light on the agentiality of technological artefacts (Akrich 1992; Ihde 1990; Latour 2009; Verbeek 2005 ), but they tend to be bounded by the temporality and configurations of use. It is the finite and definite interactions that take place between humans and handleable and detachable technologies -technologies-in-use -rather than the extensive and corporeal processes involved in one's life with implanted technologies that have occupied STS scholars and philosophers of technology (Dalibert 2014) . In the few works that have explored implanted technologies, the latter are shown to be far from straightforward (Besmer 2012; Dalibert 2014; Kaufman et al. 2011; Lettow 2011; Oudshoorn 2015) : the insertion of the implant (e.g. pacemaker, implantable cardioverter defibrillator, cochlear implant) under the skin amounts neither to its disappearance nor to its transparency, but rather entails new bodytechnology configurations and ways of being in the world. In the lineage of Haraway's (1991) famous figure, such configurations have been qualified as cyborg (e.g. Besmer 2012; Ihde 2008; Oudshoorn 2015; Verbeek 2008) .
Notwithstanding its hermeneutic value, the cyborg has fallen victim to its own success: a material-semiotic figure that incarnates and illustrates the ontological intertwinement of humans and technologies and the increasing porosity between bodies and technologies/technoscience, 1 the cyborg has become a linguistic trope. Thus detached from its material grounds, it flattens and reduces the myriad human-technology relations to a single all-embracing and amorphous term (Sobchack 2006) . As a result, not only are the particularities and practicalities of lives and bodily experiences with implanted (and prosthetic) technologies made invisible, but people living with such intimate technologies are also "made to figuratively speak for a cyborgian existence" (Betcher 2001, 38) . Feminist posthumanist scholars have emphasised the necessity of reckoning with the agency and materiality of humans and technologies, of bodies and technological artefacts, when attending to their relations (Alaimo and Hekman 2008; Barad 2007; Lettow 2011; Oudshoorn 2015) . In this article, I will follow their enjoinment to explore what it means to be living with an implanted technology. In particular, I will examine how people live (and learn to live) with spinal cord stimulation (SCS), which is a type of neuromodulation technology.
Starting from the cases of Mrs. Bloemen and Mr. van Houten, I will introduce the implanted technology and I will try to understand why and how it can be experienced very differently (positively by one, negatively by the other). To do so, I will attend to what the technology does to bodies and inversely what bodies do to the technologies. This will contribute to understand the intimate relations and reconfigurations at play between humans and the implanted technology, as well as what it means to be living with SCS. I will show that while SCS (and its design) prescribe certain behaviours, two processes, embodiment and incorporation, which are dependent on gestures, bodily materiality, and one's embeddedness in relations and normative injunctions are vital for people to become and live satisfactorily with the neuromodulation technology. While bodies and the way they are experienced are reconfigured in particular ways by spinal cord stimulation, living and especially living well with such technology brings to the fore the relationality and intercorporeality of one's existence as well as the norms attached to who and what counts as fully humans.
Mrs. Bloemen, Mr. van Houten and Spinal Cord Stimulation
To begin this exploration of what it means to be living with spinal cord stimulation, I will present two "cases," or rather, the ways in which the neuromodulation technology is experienced and lived by Mr. van Houten and Mrs. Bloemen. These two cases, while highly contrasting, are exemplary of processes at play for the people living with SCS that I interviewed. caused by various types of neuropathy or failed back surgeries. It modulates nerve activity through the delivery of electrical energy directly to a target area, here the dorsal columns of the spinal cord. The continuous administration of electrical pulses interrupts pains signals, thereby reducing neuropathic pain perception 4 (in one's back, legs and feet). That is, SCS does not cure the cause of pain but replaces pain perception by another, "more pleasant," sensation called paraesthesia 5 (which is usually described as tingling). Surgically implanted in the body, it is an invasive technology. During surgery, which is performed under local anaesthesia with the patient lying prone on the operating table, the percutaneous lead, which is six centimetres long, five millimetres wide and consists of eight flat electrode contacts (St. Jude Medical), is placed with the help of X-ray images into the epidural space (figure 1). Then, the neurosurgeon connects the lead to a pulse generator (located outside the body) and the nurse programs it. The stimulation settings are defined and adjusted in coordination with the patient and his or her needs. That is, the patient, who is awake, provides information on whether the dorsal column is stimulated at the right side(s) and level(s): the electrical field on the dorsal column should excite the nerve fibres that innervate the painful area, and the paraesthesia brought about by the stimulation should completely cover the painful area. Once the stimulation program is set, the surgery can come to an end. Patients usually stay overnight and go home the following day. There is a consecutive trial period of several days: only if the trial period is successful -i.e. only if a patient experiences significant pain relief -the external pulse generator is converted into a smaller one which is implanted under the skin of the lower abdomen or upper buttock during a second surgery. In the Netherlands, most of the implanted pulse generators are still non-rechargeable, thus have to be surgically replaced three to seven years later (figure 1). Figure 1 : the percutaneous lead, the pulse generator, and their respective position
The electrode lead and the pulse generator -the implanted parts -are not the only pieces of technology that constitute the neuromodulation device. It also counts external components: a remote control and a coil (figure 2). People living with SCS can use the remote control to adjust the stimulation amplitude or to switch between stimulation programs. To do so, they must not only plug the coil into the remote control by means of a wire, but they must also position and maintain it over the pulse generator (i.e. on their lower abdomen or upper buttock) so that the latter can connect, via radio frequency, to the remote control. However, while they can use the remote control to choose between different programs and change the stimulation amplitude when or if their pain varies during the day -the augmentation of the stimulation amplitude increases the sensation of paraesthesia, and inversely -they cannot modify or redefine the program settings, which can only be done by the nurse during control visits. Mr. van Houten is grateful for the neuromodulation technology that has not only become part of his body but has also enabled him to do things and to be part of the world -of life -again. In fact, he is so content with it that, as he told me later in the interview, he would like to have a zipper put in his back so that the world could see his implant, which he calls a pacemaker for his legs and back. In contrast, even though she would not have it removed nor turned off for the world since it is a big help for minimizing her pain, Mrs. Bloemen is unhappy with her neuromodulation device. She does not like it because she cannot read the screen of the remote control (she lost sight in one eye because of diabetes and barely sees with the other), and the buttons are too small for her to use. While she acknowledges that SCS has changed her life, enabling her to simply be and "do things" in the world (e.g. go shopping with her daughter or for walks with her family), it does not feel as part of her. In fact, her neuromodulation device distresses her because she can neither touch it nor look in the mirror at her lower back without feeling or seeing the pulse generator's shape, and she finds it all the more abject because her husband can also see it and touch it (even if under her skin). (Verbeek 2005, 11) . The interaction with the SCS system through the use of the remote control is "scripted," or even "pre-scribed," behaviour. As conceptualised by Madeleine Akrich (1992) and Bruno Latour (2009), technologies can have "scripts" inasmuch as they can prescribe certain actions, just as a movie script does. The scripts embedded and conveyed by a technological artefact therefore invite or suggest certain actions while they inhibit or discourage others (Verbeek 2011, 19) . Indeed, while the intensity of the stimulation, hence the paraesthesia and pain can be influenced, steered even, by one's posture and bodily movements -a central aspect that I will discuss later -the presence of the remote control affects -discourages -this bodily activity.
In fact, after the implantation procedure, people are instructed by the neurosurgeon and/or by the nurse in charge not to do certain movements -e.g. to bend their back or carry heavy bags -for a few months to prevent the lead from getting displaced. It can be said that this advice materializes in, or in Latour's (2009) The remote control is not the only piece of technology that acts and has an effect on one's becoming with spinal cord stimulation. The implanted lead and pulse generator also do things -e.g. they generate and deliver electrical currents that modulate nerve activity. Assuredly, the remote control (connected to the coil) has been the respondents' immediate response to how they relate to the SCS system and as such appears to be people's interface with the neuromodulation device. Nevertheless, the tendency to focus on handle-able and usable (and overwhelmingly detachable) devices might also be an artefact of STS and philosophy of 
Gestures, Embodiment and Becoming with Spinal Cord Stimulation
Spinal cord stimulation is an implanted technology. Or rather, two of its components, the lead and the pulse generator, are implanted under the skin, respectively positioned on one's spine and at the level of one's lower abdomen or, in rarer cases, upper buttock. As aforementioned, to resort to the remote control to modulate the stimulation amplitude or to switch between programs is scripted or even pre-scribed behaviour. However, in one's relations with SCS, the remote control is not necessarily central. The relationships are more intimate. The intensity of the stimulation, hence paraesthesia and pain, can be influenced and steered even, by one's posture and bodily movements -even though the presence of the remote control affects (inhibits or discourages) this bodily activity. Bodily gestures are crucial for the becoming transparent of SCS:
for its embodiment (Ihde 1990 ). In Ihde's acceptation, embodiment is one instance of technical mediation: it refers to the technology being perceived as a "quasi me" while extending one's field of perception. Embodied, the technology neither attracts attention to itself nor is experienced as bothersome. Rather, it becomes (quasi) transparent at the sensory-kinetic level: it is embodied in the body schema (Merleau-Ponty 1962 [i]n the beginning, I thought I will never get used to it, because you constantly feel that trembling in your legs. And also, if you travel and you sit in the train, and the train or the bus drives over a bump, you feel that extra. [..] But at some point you feel it no more. … At one point I sat down and I thought: "oh, yes, that thing is still on, I didn't feel it at all today."
Eventually -relatively quickly -one becomes accustomed to the new sensations elicited by SCS.
They become imperceptible, transparent.
Furthermore, the bodily movements composing one's groping with the neuromodulation technology soon become structured and purposeful: they become gestures, an "organised [form] of kinesis through which subjects navigate and alter their worlds" (Noland 2009, 4 Having become attentive to and deeply aware of the ways in which the technology affects her body and, inversely, the ways in which her body affects the technology (i.e. the generated stimulation), she directs the stimulation and paraesthesia through her gestures. The technology is made close and familiar; it becomes intimate.
As people experiment and learn to live with spinal cord stimulation, they are moved by the implanted technology. They perform new gestures, thereby enacting a different body. With the neuromodulation technology, not only are bodily movements created and/or transformed, but one's kinaesthetic experience and bodily sensations are also reconfigured. This enactment of particular gestures and correlate kinaesthetic and sensory assessment of the effect of the stimulation is a groping process. As developed in the next section, the latter engenders a renewed appreciation of the way one's body is present for oneself, which entails a renewed awareness of one's bodily materiality.
Living with Spinal Cord Stimulation and Becoming Intimate with One's Materiality
As Merleau-Ponty formulated it, "the body is the fabric into which all objects are woven" (1962, 235) , and being is always being in as well as to the world. Being a body-in-pain, however, enacts a world in which one's field of possibilities is hindered and hampered, a world that is even experienced as shattered and shattering. Being a body-in-chronic-pain (un-) makes one's world (Scarry 1985) . As Drew Leder (1990) phrases it, in pain the body "dys-appears." In the normal course of events, the lived body is characterized by a primordial absence, or rather absence and presence are intertwined in the lived body: absent presence, the body is characterized by ecstasis (Leder 1990, 21-22) . Derived from the Greek ek-stasis, the lived body whereby we are-in-theworld "stands out." That is, its "very nature … is to project outward its place of standing" (Ibid, 22) . Ecstatic, the body is experienced transparently -it is absent. But in (chronic) pain or in sickness, the lived body is characterized by a secondary absence -a "dys-appearance." Dysappearance characterizes the body's absent absence. That is, the body is no longer experienced as transparent, as the (back-) ground of our being-in-the-world, but it is rather brought back into the foreground of our awareness.
With spinal cord stimulation, the body's absent absence 7 and more generally how it is present to oneself is precisely what matters. For the somatechnology to become (i.e. be experienced as) transparent, implies getting in touch -becoming intimate -with one's bodily materiality. SCS not only puts bodies in motion -i.e. enables them to move -but also creates bodily sensations -the feeling of vibration as the electrodes fire onto the spinal cord and that of paraesthesia progressively replacing the pain. These sensations render the lived body nontransparent. However, if it is not experienced as an absent presence (as disappeared), it is no longer experienced as something alien or other than oneself (dys-appeared, as in chronic pain)
either. As people living with SCS attend to and become more intimate with their bodily materiality, its agency, and that of the implanted technology, they start experiencing the neuromodulation device as transparent and their body as no longer an incapacitating "absent absence" (Ibid). A degree of opacity remains however, as complete intimacy need not be achieved -e.g. one does not need to be aware of the blood being pumped in his/her heart and circulating through his/her veins -but to live (satisfactorily) with SCS, one must become familiar with and progressively habituate to one's nerve activity as it is being modulated by electrical current and affected by one's movements and gestures. While the dys-appeared body in chronic pain is incapacitating, in paraesthesia it is enabling, which has SCS being experienced as a "belong [ing] somewhere again, [as being] part of the life," to use Mr. Van Houten's words. As such, with spinal cord stimulation, the body can be said to "eu-appear." The term is borrowed from Kristin
Zeiler who, in contrast to the Greek prefix dys that is negatively connoted, uses "eu to highlight the experience of the body as well, easy or good" (2010, 338). Through attentiveness to one's body-with-technology-and-in-paraesthesia, the body is experienced positively. When playfully experimenting with the technology, what it does to one's body, and what one's body does to the technology (e.g. the stimulation), or when doing particular gestures to steer the stimulation, awareness of one's eu-appearing the body is reflective; it becomes pre-reflective when ones grows accustomed to the tingling sensation for instance. In both cases, it creates a feeling of empowerment -I can.
Furthermore, living with the neuromodulation device not only brings about a "reworlding" (Besmer 2012 ) through this transformed bodily mode of being; it also materializes singular bodies. As the electrodes fire and stimulate the spinal cord's nerve fibres at a certain amplitude and frequency, the burning and shooting pain felt in one's lower back, legs, and/or feet is replaced by paraesthesia (tingling sensation). In fact, as the electrode array is implanted and positioned on the spine, and as the field of stimulation is mapped, pain is, to a certain extent, realized. That is, spinal cord stimulation objectivises -makes visible or concrete for oneself and to others -the experienced pain and thereby enacts the body-in-pain. This realization might also contribute to feeling empowered by the technology (see Jackson 1994, 210-222 Bodies' transformation with the somatechnology constitutes a re-worlding. However, even though being attentive to the materiality and agency of both bodies and spinal cord stimulation is necessary for apprehending what it means to be living a neuromodulation technology, the focus on embodiment is not sufficient to explain the striking difference that exists between Mrs.
Bloemen and Mr. van Houten in how liveable and satisfactory the technology is for them.
Whether spinal cord stimulation is considered to be part of their body is key here: processes of incorporation are also at play with somatechnologies. -IH: It's functional, but it's also in the way.
Incorporating Spinal Cord Stimulation and (Failing at) Doing
-HMB: Yeah, the only time I see it is when we're in bed, to put it bluntly.
-MB: Yes, yes, I know that. But with clothing, you do take it into account too. And then, you want to be sure that others don't see it.
-HMB: But if you wear a skirt or tight pants, you don't see it.
-MB: Yes, but you have to assume that that's the case. Bloemen's distress over the visibility of implanted device(s) for others and her preoccupation with clothing reinstate the specular dimension of the female body, female bodies being more subjected (than men's) to others' gaze (Bartky 1997; Bordo 1997) . Bodies with (soma-)
technologies are not situated outside of (cultural and societal) power relations. The latter matter for one's -here Mrs. Bloemen's -ability to relate to one's somatechnology and to have it become (a) part of one's body.
While incorporating spinal cord stimulation is a highly relational process that brings to the fore one's intercorporeal dimension, it is also intrinsically linked to putative humanness. Who and what counts as human not only informs the extent to which the neuromodulation device can be incorporated but also how people can live with it. Mrs. Bloemen's suffering over the possibility for others to see the implanted pulse generator (which informs her inability to incorporate the neuromodulation technology) cannot be understood without considering how for her being human is intrinsically linked to (white heteronormative) femininity. Having internalized the gaze (to use the Foucauldian terminology), her ambiguous yet intimate relation with SCS threatens her humanness. The presence of the pulse generator under her skin, implanted yet touchable and visible, "is in the way" of properly doing (white heteronormative) femininity, which entails achieving smooth bodily contours. "A woman's skin must be soft, supple, hairless and smooth;
ideally, it should betray no sign of wear, experience, age, or deep thought," as Sandra Lee Bartky observes (1997, 137) . The implanted neuromodulation technology obstructs the (re-)enactment of gender norms (in Mrs. Bloemen's case, femininity).
Although it would be tempting to construe the neuromodulation technology's interference with femininity and its performance as a welcome disruption and transgression of gender norms (thereby revealing how gender is always an -arbitrary and violent, always unattainable -artifice),
in Mrs. Bloemen's case it is lived as a failure to "be" fully human. Furthermore, her distress over the visibility of her neuromodulation technology (and pulse generator especially) is intertwined with the injunction to pass as able-bodied in order to be (seen) as fully human. Humanness, or rather the recognition thereof which entails civil invisibility (as opposed to stigma), is granted to unmarked, i.e. putatively normal and abled, bodies (Garland-Thomson 1997; . To a certain extent, Mrs. Bloemen's malaise over her somatechnologically-transformed body is imputable to the "compulsory able-bodiedness" that governs our societies, as Robert McRuer (2006) named it.
For Mrs. Bloemen, the invisibility of her implanted devices is closely connected to the invisibility of her own body. Even though her body is no longer present to herself as a hindering absent absence (it no longer dys-appears), she experiences it as having become highly present to others:
with spinal cord stimulation, especially the neurostimulator, it/she is marked and stands out as differently-abled. She becomes disabled. Yet, enacting femininity is intertwined -or intersectswith enacting an able and healthy body. Like (white heteronormative) femininity, health and ablebodiedness are unachievable (if only because they are only temporary conditions) yet potent positions against which humanness is measured.
Interestingly, age/ing seems to ease conceiving the somatechnology as (a) part of one's body. To a certain extent, age/ing naturalizes living with somatechnology. As Mrs. Baten (61) told me, when she talks to friends about her neuromodulation technology, she Mrs. Baten, who is experiencing ageing and its effects, considers SCS to be (a) part of her. In fact, it might be insofar as she is becoming (an) elderly and views the neuromodulation technology as a normal or ordinary part of the ageing process that she is able to identify with it. Age/ing renders intimacy and identification with spinal cord stimulation un-, or at least less, problematic.
To a certain extent, somatechnologies produce ageing, and even elderly bodies. It resonates with philosophy of technology's "empirical turn" to which this article is also indebted and where attention is given to technological artefacts rather than to a transcendental notion of Technology and its conditions of possibility (Verbeek 2005) . 3 Clinically, while acute pain is a healthy and useful warning signal (it indicates that something is wrong with one's body), when it is chronic, pain has no warning function anymore: it becomes the problem. Intractable chronic pain severely impairs people's lives as it has a negative influence on almost all aspects of life: on one's physical abilities, sleep, social life, mental health and wellbeing -on one's world (Jackson 1994; Scarry 1985) . 4 SCS is originally based on the gate control theory elaborated by Ronald Melzack and Patrick Wall (published in 1965 in Science). It postulates (electrical) inhibition of pain by non-painful stimuli (Rossi 2003, 10) . However, as Cecile De Vos argues, while the gate control theory constitutes the first framework for understanding how SCS works, it remains "an oversimplication of the complex mechanisms that occur in the spinal cord and brain" (2013, 11) . 5 Stimulation frequency influences the perceived paraesthesia. Frequencies below 30Hz induce distinct tingling sensations (described as many tiny prickles or tickles), whereas stimulation with higher frequencies is experienced as a smoother sensation. New stimulation paradigms (frequencies of 500Hz and above) are believed not to cause any paraesthesia and to achieve good results (De Ridder et al. 2010; De Vos 2013) . 6 Were Don Ihde (1990) concerned with the ways technological artefacts mediate the relation between someone and his/her body, rather than with human-world relations (of which material bodies tend to be absent), such an instance of technical mediation could constitute a hermeneutical relation. This relation points to the world being perceived by means of an artefact, the latter providing an interpretation of the world that needs to be interpreted. 7 The body's absent absence does not amount to its "mere" presence, but rather to dys-appearance. Dysappearance is negatively connoted: the body is experienced or present to oneself as a something bad, ill, or alien. Presence does not have such connotation. Conversely, as I will discuss later, with spinal cord stimulation, the body can be experienced or present to oneself as something good, well and even pleasurable, such as when swimming and enjoying the strength of one's arms or the sensation of the water on one's skin: the body then eu-appears (see Zeiler 2010) . For able bodies, most of the time, the body is experienced or present to oneself as an absence presence: it disappears. Unnoticeable, it is me. 8 The concept of incorporation has mainly been used to differentiate between usable or handleable tools and intimate technologies, especially prostheses. Incorporation has been linked to body ownership (De Preester 2011), but implanted technologies have been left unexplored as if implantation amounts to both straightforward embodiment and incorporation. Others have showed that incorporation is an active and relational process of identification with one's changed body (Slatman 2012; Slatman and Widdershoven 2010; Sobchack 2010) . These approaches particularly resonate with how SCS becomes (conceived as) part of one's body.
